Monk business: an example of the dynamics of organizations by Corchón, Luis C.
Working Paper 00-85 
Economics Series 27 
November 2000 
Departamento de Economia 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
Calle Madrid, 126 
28903 Getafe (Spain) 
Fax (34) 91624-98-75 
MONK BUSINESS: AN EXAMPLE OF THE DYNAMICS OF ORGANIZATIONS * 
Luis C. Corch6n 
Abstract ____________________________________________________________ ___ 
In this paper we present a dynamic model of an organization. It is shown that the quality of the 
members of the organization may cycle and that even if the organization promotes excellency, the 
organization may end up populated by mediocre agents only. 
Keywords: Overlapping generations, quanty organization. 
Corchon, Departamento de Economia, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. E-mail: 
1corchon@eco.uc3m.es 
* The authors is grateful to Carmen Bevia, Ifiigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe, Ignacio Ortufio-Ortin and 
Piero Gottardi for very helpful comments on a preliminary version of this paper and to CICYT for 
financial support under grants PB-93-0904 and PB-98-0024. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
In this paper we propose a simple model to study the dynamic features of orga-
nizations characterized by the following: 
1. The organization is subject to entry and exit. We model this by means of an 
overlapping generation model in which agents live for two periods. 
2. Agents are heterogeneous. We assume that they belong to two categories: 
Talented or Untalentcd. 
3. The Organization is hierarchic. In the first period, agents perform some routine 
task for which all agents are equally capable. At the beginning of the second period, 
one of them is chosen to be the boss. In this period, agents other than the boss 
perform the same task they did in the first period and obtain the same utility as 
before. 
4. There are externalities. If the boss is talented all other agents receive more 
utility than that which they would receive if the boss were untalented. 
In this framework, we introduce several simplifications in order to keep the model 
tractable: The two most important simplifications are the following: a) Agents are 
free to enter, but once they are inside the organization they must remain there for 
the rest of their lives. b) A talented agent does not create externalities if he is not 
the boss and his productivity is the same as the productivity of an untalented agent 
in the routine task. Other simplifications are that we assume two types of agents, 
two hierarchies, two periods and only one boss. We also ignore important features 
of organizations like competition among organizations, loyalties and durable capital. 
Our model may be suited to study some aspects of organizations like universities in 
Europe (where mobility across different departments is low)l, a political party like 
the communist party in the extinct U.S.S.R. or the fascist party in Mussolini's Italy, 
or charitable organizations like the Red Cross. In order to couch the previous items 
in our framework it is better to think of a small branch of the organization (like a 
small town branch of the communist party) and not, say, the Politburo. 
Our leading example is that of an abbey in medieval Europe. Early on in their 
lives, farmers have to decide to enter into the abbey or remain peasants. If a young 
peasant decides to become a monk he will spend the next period (say 25 years) copy-
ing manuscripts and farming according to the direction of the current abbot. In our 
model, when entering the abbey, young peasants do not know who the abbot will 
be, but they know the probability of the abbot being talented (or untalented).2 This 
1 In principle, it is not clear that in this example the free entry assumption is adequate. However, 
given the large demand for higher education in many parts of Europe, in practice, restrictions to 
enter were not very important because of the scarcity of teachers. 
2 An alternative assumption is that young peasants know who will be the abbot for the next 
period. But given that our periods are interpreted as consisting of a large number of years, we think 
that the formalization chosen here is more appropriate. 
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probability is exogenously given and it might be different for talented and untalented 
agents reflecting the degree of adverse selection inside the organization. At the be-
ginning of the second period, there is a lottery involving all peasants who entered 
in the previous period and a new abbot is appointed (for the next 25 years). We 
decide to model the election as a lottery to capture the uncertainties associated with 
the election of the new abbot. All agents who entered in the previous period except 
the chosen abbot, spend this new period (25 more years) doing the same task that 
they did in the first period directed by the new abbot. They share duties with a new 
generation of young peasants. 
Our equilibrium concept is very simple. Agents are expected utility maximizers 
and know all the relevant parameters of the model. The number of talented (resp. 
untalented) monks entering the abbey is such that the undiscounted expected utility 
of being a monk equals reservation utility. If the latter is larger than the undiscounted 
expected utility that a talented (resp. untalented) farmer can obtain by entering the 
abbey, no talented (resp. untalented) farmer enters monastic life. These requirements 
boil down into a pair of difference equations. 
We first focus Oll steady states (SS), where each cohort has the same number of 
talented and untalelltccl monks as the previous one. We show that under a reasonable 
assumption, there is Cl unique SS. The SS can be of three different classes: A SS with 
zero talented monks (et SSU), a SS with zero untalented monks (a SST) and a SS with 
a positive number of both talented and untalented monks (a SSM). Next we study 
the dependence of SS on the two main parameters of the model, namely the relative 
probability that the ()hbot is talented (denoted by k) and the amount of positive 
externality imposed b~' a talented abbot (denoted by 8). When k is low, talented 
people are not attracted into the organization and only SSU exist. For intermediate 
values of k only SS;\! exists. Surprisingly, if t5 is large enough, there is no SST, no 
matter how high k is. The explanation of this fact is that for k large the abbot is 
almost surely talented. Untalented monks receive a large externality from a talented 
abbot and they keep entering into the abbey even when their chances to become 
abbot are almost Z;(TO. However, if t5 is relatively low, for large k only SST exists. 
Next, we anaIyzl~ tIle dynamic system. As expected, dynamic paths can be very 
complicated so ,ve focns attention on the sharpest possibilities. If k is such that only 
SSU (resp. SST) exists and the initial condition is such that no talented (untalented) 
monk belongs to the abbey, the next cohort does not include any talented (untalented) 
monk, i.e. the SSU (SST) is locally stable. More surprisingly, for values of k which 
are a subset of those for which a SSrvI exists and from some initial conditions, there 
is a cycle: a cohort with a relatively large number of talented monks is followed by a 
cohort with a relati"el~' large number of untalented monks and this cohort is followed 
by a cohort identical to the first one, etc. Remarkably, the average number of talented 
and untalented monks in the cycle correspond to those in the SSM. 
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2. THE MODEL. 
There is a large population of potential monks composed of two kind of agents, 
talented and untalented. They live for two periods. At the beginning of the first 
period they might join the abbey and in this case they remain there for the rest 
of their lives. The number of talented (resp. untalented) agents entering monastic 
life in period t is delloted by n~ (resp. nt). In order to simplify the analysis, we 
will disregard integer problems and so we will handle the number of talented and 
untalented monks as a continuous variable. The abbot for the period t + 1 is chosen 
among all members of the cohort that entered at t. We model the election as a lottery. 
The probability that a particular talented (resp. untalented) monk is chosen to be 
the abbot in period t + 1 is 
k 1 
tt' (resp. t t ). 
kn r + nu knr + nu 
Thus, the probability that the abbot belongs to the group of talented (resp. un-
talented) monks is 
kn~ nt ) 
k tt' (resp. t t' 
'nr+nu knT+nU 
The parameter /,' lllcasures the taste for talent inside the organization. If 0 < k < 
1 any particular UdClltcd pcrson has lower chances of becoming an abbot than any 
particular untalelltccl p(:~rson. If k = 1, all agents have equal chances (this might be 
interpreted as purc ndycrse selection). Finally when k ~ 00 the probability that the 
chosen abbot is talented approaches one. Vie remark that the election of the abbot 
might be governed by deterministic rules. In this case, k reflects the uncertainties 
associated with t hc process of election (coalitions, loyalties, etc.). We will assume 
that k is exogenousl~' gin;n, i.e. it is set by the Vatican or by customary uses inside 
the monastery. 
In the first period. monks perform a routine task for which all of them (talented 
or untalented) are equally capable. Let w be the utility of a monk in his first period 
if the abbot is untalcllted and OW his utility if the abbot is talented. Since a talented 
abbot will provide better design and organization of the basic tasks performed by the 
monks we assume that 6 > 1. Let V be the utility ofthe abbot3 . Finally, let UT (resp. 
uu) be the reservatioll utility of a talented (resp. untalented farmer).We assume that 
UT > Uu· Since tal(;llt(;cl and untaIented agents perform the routine task equally well 
inside the abbey the rCcHicr lllay wonder why they perform differently outside the 
abbey. The reason for this is that inside the abbey all tasks are organized by the 
abbot and not by the monks themselves. If a talented person decides to become a 
3In order to simplif,' Ilotatioll, we assume that the utility of the abbot is independent of his type. 
It can be shown that all om maill conclusions hold if the utility of the abbot depends on his type. 
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farmer he organizes his own business. Talented agents also have greater chances to 
escape to the city aml become successful entrepreneurs there. 
We also assume the following: 
V> UT (> uu), and V > 6w (> w). 
This assumptioll can be aptly described as "It's good to be the king" after the 
famous line by Mel Brooks (History of the World, Part One, 1981). 
Let us now concentrate on the decision problem of a potential monk. In the first 
period he can obtain w with probability 
and 6w with prob'lbility 
t-l 
nu 
kn~-1 + n~-1 
kn~-1 
Thus his expectcd ntility in the first period is 
w(6kn~-1 + nt-l) 
kn!;1 + nt-l 
We remark that expected utility in the first period is independent of the type. 
However in the secolld period expected utility of a talented and an untalented monk 
are different. Let us consider the case of a talented agent first. In the second period 
there are three pos:sible outcomes. An untalented monk may be chosen to be the 
abbot with probabilit~, 
kn~ + n~ 
and, in this CClS\'. he mmld get w. He can be the abbot with probability 
k 
kn~ + nt 
so he would get V Finally another talented monk different from him may be 
the abbot. Since ,,11 the probabilities must add up to one this event occurs with 
probability 
nt +k 
1 - t t knT + nu 
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k(nt - 1) 
kn~ + nh· 
In this case he gds (511). Adding all the terms, the undiscounted lifetime expected 
utility (ET) of a talcnt ed monk is" 
_ w(okn~-1 + nt"l) kV + wnt, + kow(n~ - 1) 
ET = t-l t-I + k t t . (1) kn'j' + nu nT + nu 
A similar argument for a typical untalented monk shows that his expected lifetime 
utility (Eu) is 
_ w(hkn;~-l + nt-l) V + kw8n~ + w(nh - 1) 
EL = 1.-1 t-l + k t t (2) 
/"17 T + nu nT + nu 
Let the right hanel siele of equation (1) (resp. (2)) above be written as 
Definition 1 A DUI/umic Equilibrium (DE) given an initial condition (n~, n~) is a 
sequence (nt" n~) t= I" x fu.lfil! ing the following two conditions: 
ET(n~-I,n~-:l.Il.~!,n~,) ~ UT and if strict inequality holds then n~ = 0, (3) 
Eu(n~-I, r{:-l. n~, n~,) :S; Uu and if strict inequality holds then nh = O. (4) 
Thus, a DE requires for each cohort that entry into the abbey reaps up any 
possible utility gain that ([gents can obtain by entering into monastic life.5 
A first glimpse iuto the properties of a DE can be obtained by studying the 
particular case in which in each period, the entering cohort is identical to the previous 
one. This motiva tee; t he following definition: 
Definition 2 A Stcrll/U State (SS) is a pair (nu, nr) fulfilling the following two con-
ditions: 
ET(n~, n~,. n l'. n~,) ~ UT and if strict inequality holds then n~ = 0, (5) 
Eu(n~, n~;.II;,n],) ~uu and if strict inequality holds then n~ = O. (6) 
Taking into account (1) and (2), equations (5) and (6) can be written as: 
117 (21L' - 'UT) + k(V - wo) :S; kn~(uT - 2wo), 
"Z(2u' -uu) + V - w :S; kn~(uu - 2w8). 
(7) 
(8) 
4It can be shown tbilt all our main conclusions hold if we discount utility by a constant number. 
5 A more stringent definition of Cl. dynamic equilibrium would require that further entry from 
either type yields an c::qH'ctecl utility for this type less than the reservation utility. 
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3. STEADY STATES. 
Notice that a monk gets, at least, a lifetime utility of 2w. Thus, if the reservation 
utility of a type is less t lwn 2w. an infinite number of potential monks will join the 
monastery. Thus, the existence of a SS requires that the reservation utility of both 
types be "large enough". 
In the sequel we will require that the following inequalities are satisfied: 
?LT> 2w8 and Uu > 2w. 
This assumption hi1S the interpretation that a talented (resp. untalented) farmer 
can get outside the lllonastery 2w8 (resp. 2w) by farming the land plus some extra 
utility afforded by the liberties civilian life provides. These liberties can not be 
afforded by a monk. 
A consequence of the assumption above is that for a talented farmer to be attracted 
to monastic life he must have some chance of becoming abbot. For an untalented 
farmer to become attracted to monastic life he must have either the chance to become 
an abbot, or, at least. the chance of his work being directed by a talented abbot. In 
the rest of the pappr wc will assume that the above assumption holds. 
Let us concentrate on the issue of existence of SS. It is clear that there are four 
possible classes of SS. A, trivial, SS, in which no monk joins the monastery, a SS 
in which only untalcntecl monks join the monastery (SSU), a mixed SS in which 
both talented and ll11talented monks join the monastery (SSM) and a SS in which 
only talented monks join the monastery (SST). It is clear from equations (7) and (8) 
above that for /;; > () t 1H' trivial SS is impossible. 
Let us first conccntu1te on the SSU. From (7) and (8) it follows that 
* * 11 - w . * (V - W)(UT - 2w) 
nT = 0 , nu = and for ET < ?LT, k < (V 8) ( ) . 
V(' - 2w - W ?Lu - 2w 
Thus, given our asslllllpticms a SSU exists for sufficiently small values of k. 
Let us now compute a SS?--I. From (7) and (8) it follows that 
1,(1' - oW)(?Lu - 2w) - (V - W)(UT - 2w) 
17} 2/;;w(o - l)(?LT - ?Lu) 
qv - 8w)(28w - ?Lu) - (V - w)(28w - UT) 
n; = 
2w(8 - l)(?LT - ?Lu) 
And the non negatiyity conditions boil down to 
(\I - W)(?LT - 2w) < k < (V - W)(UT - 28w) 
(I T - ('IiJ)(?LG· - 2w) - - (V - 8w)(?Lu - 28w) 
Finally, in a SST wc hnvc that 
* V - On' * * (V - w) (UT - 28w) 
nT = . s: ,n(: = 0 and for Eu < ?Lu, k > ( 8)( 8 )" UT - 2uw V - W Uu - 2 W 
The previous arguments arc summarized in the following result: 
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Theorem 1 For every IJalu,e of k there is a unique SS. For values of k low enough 
there exists SSU only. For intermediate values of k there exists SSM only. For high 
values of k a SST exists only if Uu > 26w, and if Uu :::; 26w only SSM exists.6 
The interpretation of Theorem 1 is that if the value of k is low, only SSU exists 
since talented farmers have little chance of becoming promoted and thus they have 
no incentive to join the monastery. For intermediate values of k both talented and 
untalented farmers arc attracted to the monastery. For large values of k there are 
two cases: If the reservation value of untalented farmers is relatively high (i.e. if 
Uu > 26w), they do not enter into the monastery because their chances to become 
abbot, measured by 
k * + *' "nT nu 
are small. In fact. this probability decreases with k and tends to zero when k tends 
to infinity. But if the rcservation value of untalented farmers is relatively low (i.e. 
Uu :::; 26w), they enter the monastery, because even though their chances to become 
abbot are small, the chances that they will be directed by a talented person are great 
and this provides extra utility with respect to the utility they would get as farmers. 7 
In the latter case, the Vatican can not achieve abbeys populated by talented monks 
only by setting k arbitrarilv large. On the contrary, it is easily computed that 
nLT 
-' -'> DC when k -'> 00. 
n~, 
Thus an increase ill (he probability that a talented person becomes the abbot 
increases the number of un/aZented monks relatively to the number oftalented monks. 
We will comment more Oll this later on. 
OIf the number of monks is bound to be an integer, several SS may exist for a given k. 
7This extra utility is proportional to 15. Another interpretation of the above is that if 15 is high, 
untalented fanners enter ill (he monastery because they get a large extra utility if they are directed 
from a talented abbot. 
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4. DYNAMIC PATHS, 
In this section we will provide an analysis of the difference equations (3) and (4) 
in Section 3 above. In order to simplify notation let 
From the above expression, it is easily seen that 
Also notice that if nt: = 0, at = wO and if n~ = 0, at = w. 
With this notation in hand, expected utility for talented and untalented monks 
(equations (1) and (2) ill Section 2) can be written as follows: 
_ /-1 kV + wnt + kow(n~ - 1) 
Er = CL + t t . knT + nu 
(9) 
l~ - t-l V + kwon~ + w(nt - 1) ~(.' = a + t t' (10) 
knT + nu 
Let us consider first Ill<' case in which we start with untalented monks only and 
thus, at - 1 = w. In this (:,)s(' the equations above read 
k(V - bW) + 2wnt + kwn~(b + 1) 
ET == tt' (11) knT + nu 
Er.' == V - w + 2wn~t + ~wn~(o + 1) (12) 
knT + nu 
Let us assume that the \'alue of k is such that there is SSU only, i.e. 
1. (V - W)(UT - 2w) 
,.;; < -c'--_-...:,...:-,-__ --' 
(V - ow)(uu - 2w)' 
Suppose that in peri()cl I both types of monks enter into the monastery. Then, 
t 1,-(1' - ow)(uu - 2w) - (V - W)(UT - 2w) 
nT = kw (0 - 1) (UT - uu) . 
But, under the abo\,(' ()ssUlnption on k this expression is negative. This shows 
that a situation in which both types of monks enter is impossible. Suppose now that 
only talented farmers Cllt 8r. This implies that 
V - 11' + kwn~(o + 1) V - bw 
-------,--..::......:.--'- < Uu and n~ = ---kn~ UT - 2w 
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However the above equations for the admissible values of k imply that 
t t s: Uu - w < Uu - uW, 
which is impossible. Thus, the only possibility that is left is that only untalented 
farmers enter at t. In this case equations (7) and (8) imply that 
v - 11' 
nt = . anel k(V - bw)(uu - 2w) < (V - W)(UT - 2w). 
Uu - 2u' 
Since the last ineqwllity is precisely our condition on k we have proved the fol-
lowing: 
Theorem 2 Suppose tll!1t /\' is such that only SSU exists and that n~-I = O. Then, 
the unique DE from t () // is (u~ ::::~w, 0), i. e. the SS U. 
A similar argument ]H"(r\"CS the following analogous result: 
Theorem 3 Suppose that k is such that only SST exists and that ntJl = O. Then, 
the unique DE from t 011 Is (0, u~::::~~~), i.e. the SST. 
A possible way to S111111tl(lrize Theorems 2 and 3 is that they say that both SSU 
and SST are dynamicctlk s\(\ble. 
Let us now conce11tr<ltc 011 the case in which a SSM exists. In this case equations 
(3), (4), (9) and (10) al)()\"(, illlply that: 
t k(V - r)il.')(UU - w - at-I) - (V - W)(UT - W - at-I) 
n T = kw(8-1)(UT- UU) ,(13) 
t k(F - (\U")(()w + at - 1 - uu) - (V - w)(bw + at - I - UT) 
nu = w(8 _ l)(UT _ uu) (14) 
The corresponding 11t lll-llcgatiyity constraints are: 
where 
Ruu - UT +11(1 - R) 2': a t - 1 (R - 1) 2': bw(l - R) + Ruu - UT. (15) 
R=k(V-8w) 
- (V-w) . 
Notice that the bOllllds for k in a SSr.d and 8 > 1 imply that R > 1 and thus this 
equation can be writtcll <IS 
Rill' -UT t-I Ruu - UT s: 
---- - w > a > - uw. J?-1 - - R-1 (16) 
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It is easily seen that there are values of the parameters of the model such that the 
inequalities in (16) abo\"(: are satisfied. Moreover, (16) implies that the inequalities 
defining a SSM hold, sincc 
Ruu - UT + w(l - R) 2 at-I(R - 1) 2 w(R - 1), which implies that 
UT -2w 
---<R, and Uu - 2w - (17) 
(R - l)wc5 2 at - 1 (R - 1) 2 c5w(1 - R) + Ruu - UT, which implies that 
UT - 2c5w 
Uu - 2c5w :::; R. (18) 
It is easy to check that (17) and (18) are identical to those defining an SSM. 
In order to solve the difference equations (3) and (4) we plug equation (13) and 
(14) in the definition of ({I ,md we get 
t qv - c5w)(uu - at-I) - (V - W)(UT - at-I) 
a = . k(V - c5w) - (V - w) (19) 
From c5w 2 a l - 1 2 /('. it is easily computed that if at- I belongs to the interval 
defined by (16) abovc. ((I ,lbo belongs to this interval. Moreover a~f~l = -1. Thus, 
in this case, the DE is wn' simple. \Ve start with a value of aO which implies certain 
value of al given by eqmtiull (19) above. In period 2, we have that a2 = aa, in period 
3, a3 = al, so on and so forth. Therefore, n~ and nh take only two values. In other 
words, the DE is cyclic;)l: Suppose that a l > aO (the case a l < aO is analogous). 
Thus in period 1 \ve hnyc il "high" value of n~ and a "low" value of nh. In period 
2 we have a "low" val11e' of n~ and a "high" value of nh. In period 3 we obtain the 
same values of nj. ane! 17; that in period 1, etc. 
It is also interesting 1 () n ~1l1ark that 
11, -- ntT+
1 
* nt + nt+1 
I = nT and U U n * 2 2 = 'u' 
i.e. the average of Ill/ (met nh during the cycle equals the corresponding value in 
the SSM. 
All these findings arc summarized in the following: 
Theorem 4 FOT valu.c'i of Il~ and n~ and k such that (16) above is satisfied, the DE 
exhibits perma'nent cycfi(' behavioT with two values only. The average values of n~ 
and nh equals those in tlte SSNI. 
In order to tackle tll(' Cilse where (16) above does not hold, let us assume that 
the bounds defining all 55:\I (equations (17) and (18) above). Suppose that the first 
inequality in (16) is \'ioli1tcd, i,e. 
11 
Ruu - UT t-l 
-----w<a . 
R-l 
This implies that 1/ 1/ -= () and, thus, at = w. We will show that in period t 
Ruu - UT t 
-----w>a. 
R-l 
Suppose not, so R( "l- - '2w) ::; UT - 2w. But this inequality violates those defining 
an SSM (equation (17) (I hm'e). 
However it might 1)(' t 11(\ t the second inequality is not fulfilled, i.e. 
Ruu - UT J: 
W < -uW 
- R-l ' 
because it is easily :-'('C'l1 that the previous equation is equivalent to 
UT - W - ow 
R>, (20) 
- Uu - w - ow 
which is compatihlc' \\'it 11 the bounds of a SSM, see equations (17) and (18). If 
the second inequality dl)I':-- Ilot hold, nLr = 0, and then, at+l = ow. Now, in period 
t + 1 we can not 11(1\"C' 
J: Ruu - UT J: 
WU < R - uW 
-1 
because this would illlpk that UT - 20w < R(uu - 2ow) contradicting the bound 
for a SSM in equ(ltioll ( 1 S) ;\DOye, The other bound in equation (16) is satisfied also 
because if it were lH lt 
Ruu - UT J: 
---- -W < uW 
R -1 ' 
and this contradicts 1'<jllation (20) above. Thus, eventually, there is some f for 
which at' enters in the' illt ('l'val defined by (16) above and Theorem 4 applies. A 
similar analysis call 1)(' cl, Ill" to deal with the case where the other inequality in (16) 
is violated, i.e. 
t-l Ruu - UT J: 
a < - uW. 
R-l 
Summing up, 
Theorem 5 For L'alllcs of !I~ and np; and k such that (16) above is not satisfied, the 
DE converges ill hl'O j}(li()rls to values of n~ and n~ and k such that (16) above is 
satisfied, and, thus, TIll !l1'I1L 4 holds. 
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Why do cycles occur? Suppose that we start with a situation in which the rela-
tive number of untalclltTcl ll10nks is high. Thus, in the next period there is a high 
probability that abbot will be untalented and this implies that the number of both 
talented and untcllelltcd Lmllers entering the monastery in the next period will drop, 
but given our assul1lpt i()ll~. the number of untalented will drop more, so in the next 
period the relati,"e lllUllhcr of talented monks rises. Thus, in the next period the 
abbot will be talented with il high probability and this will attract both talented and 
untalented farmers to cuter the abbey, but given our assumptions, the untalented will 
enter in larger numbers, imcl so on. 
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5. CONCL USIONS. 
None of the basic: iclc,\s of this paper is new: The overlapping generation structure 
was introduced by S,UlI1J('ison and used extensively in monetary economics. External-
ities have been around. ,\1 h'Clst, from Pigou. Hierarchies played an important role in 
the writings of \Villi,lllls. Fillally, the idea of a type, originated in the work of Vickrey 
and Harsanyi, pervades lllrllly areas of economics like game theory and incentives. 
Our analysis has produced two unexpected conclusions. 
On the one hand, t he Humber of talented and untalented people in a organization 
may cycle. In our c<,s(~. the cycle is very specific, taking only two possible values. 
We admit that this cUlldusion may not be robust: In more general models, cycles 
may occur but it is 111llikch' that they take two values only. In any case, our point 
t 
is that the qualit\· of (ill (lrganization (measured, say, by the ratio ~) may cycle in 
u 
equilibrium. 
On the other hand. <\11 organization with high standards of promotion can be 
mostly populated by 1ll1L,lcnted persons. vVhy? Because untalented people may live 
very well under the clilntion of a talented person. This provides an explanation to 
the casual observatioll tltilt. very often, intelligent leaders are surrounded by not-so-
intelligent people. TI j(' 1 I" 1 ut! explanation of this fact is that, some intelligent people 
do not like to be sun( 111111 :c'c! by potential challengers. Without denying that this may 
be the case in SOllle illSrillJ('c's. our analysis provides an alternative answer: Intelligent 
bosses provide ,\ll Ulllhldlc\ under which the mediocre prosper. In other words, if 
untalented agents prClfit lllure in relative terms than the talented ones from having a 
good boss, untalclltcd rl,",cnts will enter in larger numbers than talented agents. Of 
course, in real orgcUli;:;) t i( Ill;';. there might be forces operating in the opposite direction, 
for instance, the c'ntl\' (d nlltalented agents may be restricted by entry examinations. 
However our point is t lli \: t !tere is a tendency for the relatively untalented to enter 
in large numbers. llO 11];\1 t Cl how high the standard of promotion is. An unpleasant 
consequence of this i;.; t llill the outcome of a policy of excellency may be not excellency 
but mediocrity. 
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